The withdrawal from the Afghan and Iraqi wars has led to the arrival of vast quantities of military equipment to the US. Much of this equipment, now unused by the military, has been redistributed to police departments via a program called 1033. In this paper, I study the causal eect on criminal activity and police behavior of the militarization of the police through this program. I do so by taking into account that military equipment is stored in various disposition centers. Police departments do not pay for the cost of these items but must cover all transportation costs. I then use the distance to a disposition center and the timing of the US withdrawal from the wars in an instrumental variable setting. Estimates show that military equipment reduces violent crime and is responsible for 60% of the rapid drop observed since 2007. More than one third of this eect is caused by the displacement of violent crime to neighboring areas. Because police departments do not consider this externality when making militarization decisions, they overmilitarize. Finally, I show that police militarization increases the number of people killed by the police. Estimates imply that all the recent increases in police killings are due to police militarization.
Introduction
Almost 70% of the US population lives under the jurisdiction of a local enforcement agency that is equipped with military weapons. At least 200 operations are deployed by the police each day with these items [Kraska (2007) ; Coyne and Hall-blanco (2016) ]. Although the US police has been partly militarized for many decades, this phenomenon has accelerated quickly with the distribution of over one billion dollars in military equipment during the last few years 1 . These rapid changes in the way public security is provided are not conned to the US. As terrorist threats have escalated recently, many police forces in Europe have increased their use of military equipment 2 . In the developing world, police departments have been heavily militarized for many years, and in some cases the army is directly used in order to ght crime 3 .
Although the use of military equipment by police has become widespread around the world, very little is known on its eects. In the US, police militarization has become highly debated following the use of military equipment by police during Ferguson's infamous riots.
The debate continued in recent years after President Obama's executive order restricted the use of military equipment by the police. After the killings in July 2016 of ve ocers in Dallas and three in Baton Rouge, changes to police militarization are being discussed again in the US Congress 4 . On one side of the argument are police departments, sheri 's oces and pro-police movements who defend police militarization as a needed tool for eective 1 These estimates are calculated using only data from program 1033 the main federal program that allows local enforcement agencies to acquire military weapons in the US. Alternatively, local enforcement agencies could buy military weapons using their own nances or Department of Homeland Security grants. Unfortunately comprehensive data on this type of acquisition of military weapons is not available.
2 Operation Sentinelle was launched in France after Charlie Hebdo massacre of January 2015 with 10'000 military forces sent across France. In 2016 both Belgian and Dutch police forces were allowed to carry heavy military guns when protecting high-risk sites. 3 The militarization of public security is particularly present in Latin America. Examples can be found with Mexico where President Calderon send 50,000 soldiers to ght drug-tracking criminals, PMOP initiative in Honduras against street gangs and Venezuelan President Maduro's decision in 2013 of sending 3,000 soldiers to combat crime in Caracas. 4 For reference: The Executive Order 13688 reformed the use of military equipment by the police in January 2015. As of September 2016 Amendment 1208 is conferenced with the Senate with the objective of reversing the executive order. and safe law enforcement. On the other side of the debate are civil liberties and activist groups who see police militarization as a violation of constitutional rights and fear that it will increase police brutality.
In this paper, I contribute to this discussion by providing causal estimates on the eects of police militarization on criminal activity and police behavior. I do so by studying Program 1033, the main program that transfers military equipment to police departments in the US.
When the army began withdrawing from the Afghan and Iraqi wars at the end of 2009, military equipment returned to the US and was then distributed to police departments through this program. In order to estimate the causal eect of this military equipment, I use the fact that, when returning from war, military equipment is available at various disposition centers across the US. I then show that police departments close to these disposition centers are especially prone to be militarized. This was particularly true after the start of the withdrawals from the Iraqi and Afghan wars, when military weapons became massively available. There are two main reasons for this behavior. First, the only cost that police departments have to incur when acquiring military equipment is the transportation cost from the disposition center. Secondly, every police department must appoint an ocer to personally inspect the military items before this is requested. Inspections can be cheaper and more frequent if the police department is located near a disposition center. I then use the timing of the US withdrawal from the wars and the closeness to a disposition center to construct an instrumental variable to estimate the causal impact of the militarization of the US police. In the estimation procedure I take particular care of the fact that disposition centers are not randomly located in the US but are a subsample of military bases. I do so Estimates suggest that more than 60% of this drop is due to police militarization. Finally, I show that at least one third of the eect that militarization has on violent crime is through the displacement of criminal activity to neighboring areas. This displacement eects have important implications for the optimality of the decision to militarize of each police department. When police departments decide on their level of militarization, they need not take into account these negative externalities on neighboring areas. Because of this, police departments are overmilitarized.
I then focus my analysis on one of the most discussed outcomes related to police militarization: police killings. The number of people killed by the police has rapidly increased, rising from 400 in the year 2000 to more than 1000 in recent years. Instrumental variable estimates show that the militarization of the police increases police killings. I show that every 1.6 million dollars spent in military equipment generates an extra police killing per year. My estimates imply that all the recent increases in police killings are due to police militarization through Program 1033. In total, 2200 individuals have been killed due to the militarization of the police caused by Program 1033. Using conservative estimates of the statistical value of life, the total cost in life lost amounts to more than 17 billion US$. This paper is related to the investigation of the causes and eects of police militariza-tion. Balko (2014) provides a complete analysis of the history of police militarization and a description of the policies and practices that led to a level of militarization unprecedented in the history of the US. ACLU (2014) reports the results of sending public records requests to 260 enforcement agencies. The study shows how enforcement agencies have become highly militarized due to the use of Program 1033 and that the major use of military equipment is in drug raids. Closer my paper, Bove and Gavrilova (2015) investigates the eects of Program 1033 on crime and concludes that militarized counties experienced a reduction in street crime level. First, I improve on the identication the causal eects of militarization. Instead of using average military aid by the federal government to predict the cross-sectional variation police militarization I use some predetermined characteristics, namely the geographical distribution of US military bases and disposition centers. This let me be sure that my results are not driven by unobserved factors that the determine the propensity of receiving military equipment. Second, I use more detailed data on police militarization at the law enforcement agency level instead of at the county level. This allows me to study displacement eects and ultimately show the existence of overmilitarization in the US police. I can do that by focusing my study on local law enforcement agencies instead of on the full set of enforcement forces in the US. The main advantage of this approach is that local law enforcement agencies have non-overlapping jurisdictions. Because of this, any increase in militarization in one jurisdiction should have no direct eect on another jurisdiction. Additionally, with this new dataset, I avoid the problem of overrepresenting policing resources in a county that includes the state capital. This problem arises because most state and federal agencies are normally located in the state capital, but their jurisdiction is broader than a county. Finally, I study the eects of militarization on a new outcome: police killings. This phenomenon has lately entered public discussion in relation police militarization and I show that this is an important dimension to consider when evaluating the overall impact of Program 1033. My work is related to Dell (2015) , which studies the eects of Mexico's policy against drug-tracking that involved, among other things, heavy use of military equipment. Estimates show that this policy actually increased drug-related violence. In my paper, I isolate the eects on crime of having military equipment instead of the more diversied policy studied in Dell (2015) . Furthermore, I can provide elasticities of military equipment on crime, as I directly observe how much police departments are militarized.
More broadly, my paper is related to the literature that studies the eects of policing on crime. The most recent literature review can be found in Chaln and Mccrary (2015) . Most related to my analysis are studies that exploit quasi-experiments that attempt to uncover the elasticities of crime to changes in policing. The main threat for credible identication in this literature is the endogeneity of policing. The main concern is that, when police departments expect increases in crime, they boost their policing eorts, thus confounding any potential negative eects of policing on crime. The rst paper attempted to address this endogeneity problem is Levitt (1997) , which uses the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections as an instrument from changes in policing. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) and Draca, Machin and Witt (2011) use terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires and London and the subsequent deployment of police in specic areas of these cities as an exogenous shock to policing to study the eects on crime. Other papers, such as Machin and Marie (2011) and Evans and Owens (2007) , use the allocation of additional resources in certain cities in the UK and the US to examine the eectiveness of policing on crime reduction. This literature shows that an increase in policing is generally eective at reducing crime. My main contribution to this literature is the study of a specic change in policing: the use of military weapons by the police. Furthermore, I am the rst to provide causal evidence on the determinants of police killings. Additionally, my study uncovers some geographical displacement eects that are in line with classical theories of rational criminals, but for which there has previously been very little empirical evidence. Finally, it is important to note that my estimates are identied from a completely new source of variation. In particular, an dierently from the other papers in the literature, I exploit an event that occurred many years before the activation of the treatment to identify the causal eect of policing. In fact, the cross-sectional variation I use is given by a combination of the position of military bases in the US that were mostly built during the WW2, and the selection of storage facilities that were selected in 1997.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2 I will present the data that is used and how program 1033 works. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy, the main results and discuss the validity of the identifying assumption. In Section 4 I explore the potential mechanisms that could generate these results. Section 5 studies the eect of militarization on police safety and police killings. Finally, in section 6, I present concluding remarks.
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The 1033 property transfer must cover all transportation costs but doesn't pay for the cost of the item. For crime data I use the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) statistics produced by the FBI.
This dataset have been published yearly since 1958 and collects data on violent crime and property crime. I then link this data to the militarization data described before by matching the agencies names.
5 Throughout the paper the analysis is conned to the lowest level of law enforcement in the US. These local enforcement agencies include police department, sheri oces 6 In the baseline specication for creating the stock of military equipment I sum up the value of military equipment acquired up to that moment without taking into account any depreciation. The rst outcome will violent crimes as these types of crime are orders of magnitude more costly to society with respect to non-violent crimes as property crimes or possession of illicit drugs. Formally I would like to estimate the following equation.
Where i identies the police department, t the year, vc it is the rate of violent crime per 1000 inhabitants and mil i,t is the value of the stock of military equipment per capita.
A problem of this analysis, that is common to other studies that trying to nd how some is the special transportation that has to be arranged from the DLA disposition center to the police department. Secondly, before the acquisition of an item, the agent appointed by the police department has to go to the disposition center to screen the item of interest and inspect its conditions. Is important to remember that most of the items transferred via the 1033 program have been already used in the Iraqi and Afghan wars and their conditions may vary. Potentially these items may require some repairs and all repair costs have to be sustained by the police department. The screening process is then essential for police departments to not incur in unforeseen repair costs. Additionally, the process of screening is rapid lasting by law a maximum of 21 days. Being able to quickly go to inspect the military equipment of interest is of fundamental importance for a police department. Because of these reasons police departments specially close to the disposition centers are prone to ask more and receive more items from the 1033 program. Figure 2 shows the location of all police departments and the 69 DLA disposition centers that participate in the 1033 program in continental US. As shown in the map disposition center are spread out throughout the US with the median distance of a police department from the closest disposition center of 106Km.
I then combine these two sources of variation (one in time and the other cross-sectional) to try to predict exogenously the militarization of all police departments. This is done with the objective of then using this rst stage estimate in a instrumental variable setting to estimate the causal eect of militarization on crime as shown in equation (1). The general specication of the rst stage is the following:
Where eqp t measures the availability of excess military equipment as proxied by the dierence from the peak of the boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan that was reached in 2009 and the subsequent years. This measure eqp t has been then normalized to 1 in 2014. Formally eqp t is dened below, where boots t is the number of boots on the ground that the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan as shown in Figure 1 :
The variable closeness(disp.center) i can be calculated in many way using the information shown in Figure 2 of the position of the police department and the DLA disposition centers.
Some natural candidates for the function closeness are the distance to the closest disposition center or a dummy indicating if a disposition center can be found in a certain radius from the police department or counting the number of disposition center around a police department.
The main identication assumption behind this strategy is that changes in the violent crime between years of high availability and low availability of equipment are not dierent between close and far away places from a disposition center other than through the military equipment received by these places. The main threat to the identication strategy comes from the fact that disposition centers are just military bases that has been selected by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1997 as DLA disposition centers for the 1033 program.
If police departments around military bases dier, in unobservables that determine changes in violent crime rates, with respect to places far away from military bases this will invalidate the identication strategy. This is a reasonable concern as places close to a military base dier on many characteristics (demographics, labor market structure, political preferences, 
With the following specication the only excluded instrument is eqp t * closeness(disp.center) i .
Because of this the only cross-sectional variation I use comes from the fact that some military bases have been selected to be disposition centers in 1997. Is important to notice that this specication discounts the fact that places disposition centers are also military bases and because of this places close to disposition have potentially dierent trends in violent crime.
Furthermore I let the closeness to a military base have a dierent inuence year by year.
Because of this I don't impose that the unobservable factors that happen close to a military base happen at the same time as the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.
First Stage
As described before there are potentially many ways of combining the information in Figure   2 to create a proper measure of closeness. As a baseline throughout the paper I dene a place to be close to a DLA disposition center is if it is located at less than 20Km (air distance) from it. Throughout the paper I will show how results are robust to many other denitions that can be used for closeness to a disposition center. The decision is useful for two reason:
First of all is one of the measures of closeness that has the best predicting power. Secondly being a dummy makes let me borrow a lot of language and tools from the treatment and control literature. In particular with this denition is very simple the to dene which of the police department are treated and which are not. Figure 3 I compare the time-series of the value of the stock of military equipment of police department close to a disposition center (I will call this police departments treated throughout the rest paper) to places close to a military base that is not a disposition center (denoted as placebo treated). First of all, we can notice how as in Figure 1 that from 2010 onward there is a huge increase in the militarization of police departments. Treated police departments are always more militarized than the placebo treated ones. This dierence is just of a few cents per capita until 2009. As soon as the withdrawal from the war in Iraq and Afghanistan happened in late 2009 the dierence between these 2 groups of police departments diverged. In 2014 treated police departments had more than 1 dollar per capita of dierence in the level of militarization. That is around a 65% more than the placebo treated police departments.
As a rst visual exploratory analysis in
More formally in Table 1 Table 1 shows formally what could be already noted in Figure 3 . Police departments close to disposition centers increase more than far away ones their level of militarization after 2009. This is true using dierent ways of calculating the closeness to DLA disposition centers.
Baseline Results
With this identication strategy I'm now able to estimate the causal eect of the militarization of the police on the violent crime rate. The baseline regression results are shown in Table 2 . OLS results shown in columns (1) and (2) For interpreting the marginal eects found in Table 2 notice that in 2014 the average militarization of a police department in the US is of 3.2 dollars per capita. This amount of money would be enough for a police department of 100000 inhabitants to aord a 10 man fully armed military squad 7 . A police department of these dimensions would have around 3.3 violent crimes a day. The estimates of Table 2 imply that without militarization the daily crimes would be around 4.5 or 4.1 depending if I use the linear of the logarithmic estimation respectively. As shown in this example the militarization of the police has a huge direct eect on the reduction of violent crime.
Plausibility of Identication Strategy
The previous results hinge on the identifying assumption that violent crime rates between years of high availability and low availability of military equipment are not dierent between police departments treated and placebo treated other than through the military equipment received by these places. Another way of looking at this assumption is that in 1997 when the program was created the selection made over which are going to be the military bases that are used as disposition centers was not biased towards places that after 2009 will have a higher drop in violent crime.
It seems reasonable to assume that the selection of disposition centers was not actively biased towards places that will experience a disproportionately high drop in violent crime 12 years later. First, because if any we would expect the bias to be in the opposite direction.
Military bases could be selected as disposition centers if they are predicted to experience an increase in violent crime around them. If this is the case I could interpret my results as a lower bound of the eect of the militarization on crime and the real eect is potentially even higher. Secondly, is not feasible to predict so many years ahead violent crime trends. This is specially true in the US where the crime has moved spatially a lot in the last two 7 Expenses for fully equipping a military squad highly depend on the type and quality of items. The example of the 10 man fully armed squad I use includes 1 armored truck, 1 explosive disposal equipment, 2 night-vision googles and 2 thermal sights. Added to this a set of 10 assault ries, sights and body armor. Depending of the quality of these items it may cost around 320000 dollars of 3.2 per capita for this hypothetical city of 100000 population police department. To explore if this is in fact the case in Table 3 I rst provide evidence that police departments treated and placebo treated are similar in many predetermined observables that are potentially related to crime. Column 2 and 3 show that treated and placebo treated do not dier in any substantial way. Is also important to notice how a treated police department and ones that not close to a military base (denominated with "Other" in the Table) are instead substantially dierent. These police departments tend to be smaller in population and bigger in area and have lower crime rates with respect to the treated ones. This observation further validates the identication strategy that is used throughout the paper that controls for the distance to a military base as an included instrument. 
The sample includes all police departments yearly data from 2000 to 2014. The comparison year has been set to be 2009 the last year before the start of the withdrawal from the wars. The estimates of σ 1,t are shown in Figure 5 . Before 2010, there is no statistical dierence between places close and far away from disposition centers. As soon as troops, and more importantly military equipment, returned to the US violent crime around disposition centers starts decreasing faster than in any other place.
Robustness
In Table 5 I are not disposition centers without using any information from other police departments.
From Table 6 we can observe how all the main results are practically the same both in the direction and the size. This is in part is to be expected as the variation the main regression is using is the dierent trends in crime post-2009 between places close to a DLA disposition center and other military bases. vc i,t = σ i +σ t +σ 1 eqp t * 1(F AKEdisp.center < 20Km) i +σ 2,t year t * 1(mil.base < 20Km) i + i,t I repeat this procedure 1000 times and plot in Figure 6 the distribution of the σ 1 with the thick red line indicating the same reduced form parameter with the real 69 disposition centers. As shown in Figure 6 in general there is no eect on crime of being close to a fake disposition center. Comparing results with the parameter of the actual reduced form as shown by the thick red line in Figure 6 no combination of military bases assigned as fake disposition centers can replicate the huge negative eects on violent crime of being close to the real disposition centers. The claim of the paper is that the dierence between places close to disposition centers and any other place in the US is the preferential access to the program 1033 and ultimately the militarization of these police departments.
As a last check of the robustness of the main results in Table 8 are shown the estimates of a set of IV regressions that do not include in the sample large police departments and another set of regression not weighted by population. The rst purpose of this regression is to see how much the results are driven by big police departments. Additionally this regression will inform us on the complier population and if there are any heterogeneous eects along the population dimension. First thing to notice is that in all the regressions the main results are maintained: Militarization reduces violent crime. These eects are substantially less important with respect to the main results where all police departments are included but the F-statistics of the rst stage are bigger. Looking rst at the size of the coecient we can say that militarization is more eective when carried out by big police departments. This is in line with the idea that for eectively using this equipment specialized training is needed.
This specialized training and the creation of a full-time militarized squad is only feasible by big police departments that can aord for this training and have at their disposal a bigger amount of ocers. Secondly F-statistics increase as big police departments are eliminated from the estimating subsample. This is very informative over which are the compliers of the instruments used in the estimation. What the change of the F-statistic suggests is that big police departments are not part of the complier population. This is again in line with the idea that big police departments do not have as many budgetary constraints when deciding if they should get some military equipment. Because of this, in the context of my estimation strategy, they can be seen as always-takers. In other words, big police departments can aord the transportation cost of military equipment even if located at more that 20Km.
Mechanisms

Displacement Eects
In line with criminals as rational actors, criminals may react to increases in militarization in a jurisdiction by moving there criminal activities to neighboring ones. Is crucial to understand the presence and size of these displacement eects especially for the evaluation of policing policies. First of all, the eectiveness of hot spot policing, that mandates to concentrate policing eorts in places where crime is pervasive, is conditional on how important displacement eects are. Furthermore, more specically to program 1033, displacements eects may induce the overmilitarization of police. This is due to the fact that militarization decision through the 1033 program are made at the police department level while, if displacement eects exists, spillovers will be suered by neighboring police departments as well. Because of this negative externalities not internalized by the police department when making the militarization decision we would observe that in equilibrium police departments are militarized more than optimally.
In this section I'll investigate the presence of displacement eects with the following econometric framework:
Where W i is a weighting matrix that select the range and intensity of the displacement eects and mil t is a vector of militarization per capita of all police departments at time t.
When evaluating displacement eects as a baseline regression I study spillovers conned by the commuting zone where the police department is located. In average each commuting zone has 76 police departments. So in this specication W i mil t is the average militarization of police departments in the commuting zone of police department i. The analysis of displacement eects adds another endogeneity problem as in equation (2) also W i mil t is potentially endogenous because of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. First, neighboring police departments may decide to increase their militarization because of a general trend in the increase in violence of a certain commuting zone leading to a reverse causality problem.
Secondly there are potentially many unobservables that are common to a commuting zone that cause at the same time militarization of a police department and violent crime changes.
Because of this I will also use as an instrument the average closeness to a disposition center in the commuting zone.
As shown in Table 9 displacement eects are present and seem to be relatively important.
For each dollar per capita spend in a police department commuting zone the violent crime rate increases by 0.5 per 1000 inhabitants. In column (4) where the outcome of interest is the logarithm of the violent crime rate we observe and increase in violent crime of 2.6 percent.
This amounts to around one third of the direct eect that the militarization of police has on violent crime.
For interpreting the marginal eects found in Table 9 I return to the example of a police department of 100000 inhabitants that is able to aord a 10 man fully armed military squad.
As discussed in the previous chapter a police department of this dimensions would have around 3.3 violent crimes a day in 2014. The estimates of Table 9 Another way of quantifying the results is looking at the total eect of 1033 program since it has been implemented in 1997. The estimates shown in Column (4) of Table 9 predict that this program has prevented 1.8 million violent crimes since it's inception. Most of these prevented violent crimes are in recent years. Trying to put a monetary value of to the prevented cost to society produced by the reduction in crime of the 1033 program is not an easy task. First of all, the cost produced by violent crime depends by the type of crime. Secondly, even when a crime is know dierent methods disagree on cost produced by each crime. An excellent review of the literature is given by McCollister, French and Fang (2010) . Using less costly violent crime (that is 42310$ for a robbery) as the most conservative estimate program 1033 has prevented is 76 Billion US$ in costs.
Incapacitation or Deterrence
The mechanisms by which more policing may lead to a reduction in crime can be very broadly divided into two categories: incapacitation and deterrence. The rst eect is just a mechanical one, where more policing leads to more arrests, less criminals circulating on the streets and consequently less crimes. Deterrence instead arises when rational criminals observe the change in policing and decide as a response to change their amount of criminal activity. From a policy maker perspective is important to understand which of the two mechanisms has caused the drop in crimes. If the main mechanism at play is incapacitation this would create two additional costs for the society: First, incarceration is expensive and this especially true for violent crimes that generally require a long incarceration period.
Secondly, the productive possibilities of the individual incarcerated are diminished (both during and after the incarceration). Instead deterrence is a much more desirable mechanism as it doesn't involve any cost to the judicial system and potentially moves economic activities out of the illegal sector.
For detecting which mechanism is at play is important to notice that, if the eect was all due to incapacitation, arrests would increase due to the militarization of the police. Instead, if the mechanism was deterrence, we should observe a decrease in the arrests after a police department gets militarized. As a rst way of investigating which mechanisms is at play in Table 10 I look at the eects of the militarization of the police on arrests of violent criminals.
Results seem to indicate that arrests have decreased but not in a statistical important way.
The eects of the militarization of the police on arrests are always smaller than with respect to the eects it has on crime. This seems to suggest that the mechanisms at play are some combination between incapacitation and deterrence.
For a better understanding of how these two force shape the dynamics of arrests and crimes I study the following econometric framework.
Where Arrests i,t is the number of violent crimes cleared by arrest per 1000 inhabitants.
I then compare these estimates to the one already reported in Figure 5 that studies the same dynamics for violent crime. to the numerous deaths in the police forces in the US. One of the potential benet of the militarization of the police, that the organization blue lives matter puts forward, is that the police may do their job without risking of being injured or killed. The reason is that policemen could better protected and are able to detect the presence of potential threats easily with military equipment. On the other side, policemen may be more prone to be involved in more aggressive and dangerous operations now that they are militarized leading ultimately to a higher risk for policemen. Using ocial FBI data I study the eect of the militarization of the police on deaths and injuries on the job of policemen. A rst look at the data shows how each year in the US between 40 to 50 policemen are killed and more than 40000 are assaulted. Table 12 reports the eect of militarization on the safety of the police.
Results show how none of these variables is statistically aected by the militarization of the police. All estimates are positives meaning that potentially the militarization of the police made police ocers even more unsafe.
Another important outcome that is often discussed with the rise of militarization of the police the use of deadly force by the police while in the line of duty. Unfortunately data on these killing are either incomplete or come from unocial sources. One ocial statistic is provided by the FBI supplementary homicides report that documents an increase in the last years of police killings, reaching a peak in 2013 of 435. Unfortunately agencies are not required to communicate to the FBI about police killings and so any aggregate information is severely unreported. More relevant to the estimation, this underreporting may be not random as agencies may decide to not submit the report exactly in years when these type of homicides are high. The quality of the data of the FBI data and other ocial sources, like the BoJ Arrest-Related Deaths, has been shown to be very poor [Banks et al. (2015a) ]. Table 12 shows the eects of the militarization of the police on the number of individuals killed by the police (over 10000 inhabitants). Estimates show that militarization of the police increase police killings. Each dollar per capita more of military equipment increases the number of killing by the police by 0.08 per 100000 inhabitants. This estimate implies that the militarization of the police can explain all of the recent increases in police killings. Around 2200 individuals have been killed due to the militarization of the police caused by the program 1033. Using conservative estimates of the statistical value of life in the US the total cost in life lost amounts to more than 17 billion US$ 9 . Another important collateral cost of the increase in the number of police killings is that that police as an institution may lose value and trust in the citizens. From Gallup polls we can see how the condence in the police is the lowest since 1993 with only 52% of Americans trusting the police. Finally studying the causes of police killings may also give us some insights in an even more prevailing phenomenon that is people injured by the police. As shown by [Miller et al., 2016] in 2012 55400 people where injured by the police. While no systematic dataset is available for studying the causal eect of militarization of police related injuries is reasonable to assume that as police killings have increased due to militarization so have injuries.
When looking at police killings in the US a very important dimension often discussed by the general public is race. Most famously, the activist movement black live matter, campaigns against what they see as systematic racism and violence by the police against black people. The previously cited Gallup polls on the trust that citizens have on the police show a marked racial gap in this statistic. While 58% of whites trusts the police only 29% of blacks have the same feelings. Famously the DoJ has investigated the Ferguson police department after the protests for the shooting of a black man called Micheal Brown. The investigation indeed found a pattern of racial bias towards the black community. Exploring 9 Estimates used by government agencies to asses the value of a life vary from 7.9 million dollars use by the Food and Drug Administration up to 9.4 million dollars used by the Transportation Department if this patterns is present in the US as a whole or is isolated to a few police departments is particularly hard because, as discussed previously, is very dicult to have detailed data on police killings. Unfortunately sometimes even when basic data on a incident is available the race of the victim is not reported. For example, in the data provided by fatalencounters, 36% of the times race is not reported. Even with this partial information we can observe how blacks are statistically overrepresented in the victims of police killings. Even if blacks represent 12% of the population of the US 31% of the police killings are suered by blacks. In column (2) and (4) Regressions are weighted by population. * p-value<0.10, ** pvalue<0.05, *** p-value<0.01 Note: This table reports the IV estimates of the eect of militarization on violent crime. In column (1) and (2) police departments with more than 500000 and 250000 inhabitants are dropped repectevely. Column (3) and (4) report the results without weighting for population and dropping police departments with less tahn 5000 and 10000 inhabitants respectively. The sample yearly data from 2007 to 2014 at the police department level. In all columns clustered standard errors at the state*year level are reported in brackets. * pvalue<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01 Note:
In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the violent crime rate per 1000 inhabitants, in columns (3) and (4) 
